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Trade between developing countries, or South-South trade, has been growing rapidly 
in recent years following significant reductions in tariffs. However, significant 
barriers remain, and there is currently reluctance among many developing countries to 
undertake further reductions. In addition African countries and in particular least 
developed African countries are still marginal players in this reframing of geography 
of trade. The erosion of preferential access to Northern markets remains their major 
concern and the status quo in multilateral liberalization could be seen as a desirable 
scenario. This emphasis on developed countries markets, principally Europe and the 
US, is likely to represent a missed opportunity for African countries. Unless those 
countries are granted broader preferences by the European Union and other developed 
countries, especially in agriculture, significant gains would be obtained from trade 
preferences provided by other developing countries. To assess this we compare the 
potential effects of the removal of barriers on trade between African countries and 
other developing countries with the gains from developed country liberalization. A 
general equilibrium model containing information on preferential bilateral tariffs is 
used to estimate the impacts.  
 
 
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of UNCTAD or its members. The designations and terminology 
employed are also those of the authors. Any citation of this paper should ascribe 
authorship to staff of UNCTAD Secretariat and not to UNCTAD. 
1. Introduction 
 
 The Doha round of trade negotiations could lead to significant cuts in MFN 
ratesi, sooner or later. This has raised serious concerns among developing countries 
about the possible erosion of trade preferencesii. Whether these concerns are justified 
or not has been the focus of various recent papersiii, although possible issues 
characterizing preferences, including that of their erosion, have been discussed since 
their originiv back in the 1960s'. A highly related concern of developing countries, and 
in particular African countries, is the still relatively poor access to sensible product 
markets in the European Union and the United States of America. The issue of 
sensitive products is likely to survive the conclusion of Doha round unless 
negotiations are firmly put on an ambitious scenario track limiting for instance the 
share of sensitive products to one percent of negotiated tariff linesv. Sensitive 
products could also represent an opportunity for some developing countries to keep 
their preferences and/or extending them. In that context, preferential access to 
sensitive products markets could be used by developed countries as a development 
assistance device. 
 
 Most of developing countries concerns, and in particular Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) concerns, appear to be North oriented although access to other 
developing countries markets appears to be much more limited. Indeed, looking at 
simple coverage at the tariff line level, around 70 per cent of the tariffs faced by 
developing country exporters are applied by other developing countries. Tariff peaks 
and tariff escalation are a major issue also in South-South trade relationshipsvi.  In 
addition, whatever the deepness of trade liberalization negotiated at the WTO, the 
level of protection in many developing countries and LDCs will not be reduced 
significantlyvii. 
 
 This emphasis on Northern markets could represent a missed opportunity for 
developing countriesviii. More attention should then be devoted to possibility and 
feasibility of trade preferences schemes among developing countries. This could 
contribute to soften the issue of the erosion of existing preferences schemes provided 
by developed countries. Developing countries preference schemes could also 
represent a powerful development instrument to be used in favour of LDCs.  
 
 The focus of the paper is the Sub-Saharan Africa region. This is justified by 
the presence within the region of most of the LDCs. This reveals socio-economic 
conditions which are often qualified as dramatic. In addition, the paper also aims at 
contributing to a general concern. Indeed, a particular attention has been paid recently 
to the issues characterizing most of Sub-Saharan African countries notably through 
the implementation by the United Nations of the Millennium Development Goalsix.  
 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Next section discusses more in 
details the potential for revisiting exiting preferences schemes, essentially North-
South based, and for implementing new ones, essentially South-South based. Section 
3 presents the various scenarios to be simulated and the simulation framework. 
Results are discussed in section 5. The last section concludes and presents some 
arguments for further discussion. 
 
 
2. What potential for new trade preferences? 
 
 Many developing and least-developed countries enjoy tariff preferences under 
the Generalised System of Preferences and more selective schemes, such as the 
Cotonou Agreement, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the EU’s Everything-But-Arms 
initiative and the USA’s African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) (UNCTAD 
2003). Even taking account of these preferences, average import-weighted applied 
tariffs on exports from these regions to developed countries are higher than those 
facing developed countries themselves. This reflects the composition of imports with 
different tariffs rather than higher tariffs on the same item. It also reflects the 
relatively weak bargaining power of the developing countries in past rounds of 
negotiations in that they were unable to secure tariff cuts on the kind of goods that 
they export. 
 
 Table 1 shows trade weighted applied tariffs, levied by developed and 
developing countries on merchandise exports from each other. These data include 
preferential rates. On average, developed countries impose tariffs of 2.1 per cent on 
imports from other developed countries, 3.9 per cent on imports from developing 
countries and 3.1 per cent from LDCs. The most significant sectors contributing to the 
higher tariffs on developing country exports are textiles, apparel and leather. On the 
other hand, developed countries also face higher tariffs when exporting to developing 
countries (9.2 per cent) than do other developing countries (7.2 per cent), partly 
reflecting the composition of trade and partly reflecting preferential arrangements 
among groups of developing countries.  
 
Insert table 1 around here 
 
Agriculture alone tells a slightly different story (table 2), with high protection 
applied in both developed and developing countries against products from both 
groups. Developed countries, however, give greater access to least developed country 
products (2 per cent) then do developing countries (12 per cent). This reflects the 
various preferential schemes previously mentioned. However, the protection is 
predominantly against temperate products grown in other developed countries with 
similar agronomic and climatic conditions. Typical developing country products such 
as coffee and tropical fruits are not particularly substitutable with temperate products. 
Notable exceptions are sugar (cane and beet sugar are substitutes), vegetable oils, 
tobacco and cotton. Many tropical products, such as coffee, attract little protection in 
developed countries. However, many developing countries have substantial tariffs on 
tropical commodities.  
 
Insert table 2 around here 
 
 Trade weighted tariffs are averaged by imports, but it is instructive to look at 
the trade flows themselves to gauge the likely impacts. These are shown in table 3. 
Total trade in merchandises at world prices amounts to $7.44 trillion (2001) 
(including intra-EU trade). Developed countries import $3.2 trillion from other 
developed countries and slightly more than $1.4 trillion from developing (including 
Sub-Saharan African) countries. Developing countries themselves import a greater 
proportion of the imports from developed countries ($1.19 trillion versus $0.83 
trillion) but South-South trade is a substantial proportion nonetheless (slightly more 
than 40%). Sub-Saharan African countries share a similar trade profile: 54 per cent of 
imports originate from developed countries and 42 per cent from developing 
countries including SSA countries.  
 
Insert table 3 around here 
 
 The high tariff burden on South-South trade poses the question as to whether 
developing countries could assist their development or the development of a specific 
group of countries by opening up their markets and eventually trading more with each 
other. One advantage is their proximity, which may imply lower transport costs. In 
addition, other developing countries, by definition at a similar stage of development, 
may not have the competitive advantage of developed countries. Thus, developing 
countries opening their markets are less likely to be swamped with imports. The 
benefits of trade come with divergences in relative factors endowment and costs. 
Table 4 shows ratios of the value of capital remuneration to other primary factors 
remuneration. SSA countries would have larger potential gains available from trading 
with countries with dissimilar endowments costs structures to one's own. SSA 
countries would gain from trade liberalization that favours land-intensive production. 
This could be obtained by establishing preferential trade agreements with all regions 
and group of countries. Gains from trade liberalization in natural resources would be 
observed only for a limited number of partners. In addition, access to market is almost 
duty free for all destinations, in particular the EU and the US. Table 4 also reveals that 
gains from trade in unskilled-labour intensive should remain limited.  
 
Insert table 4 around here 
  Simulations undertaken in this paper only consider improvements in access to 
international markets for Sub-Saharan products. The impact of such improvements 
could be leveraged by systematic improvements in supply capacity. As such our 
simulation results could represent a lower bound of changes in market access 
conditions. Policy elements, whether national or international that could increase the 
leverage of foreign market access, are briefly discussed in the last section.  
 
3. Scenarios and Simulations 
 
 As mentioned in the previous section, the focus of our simulation exercise 
remains Sub-Saharan Africa. Unless specified, Sub-Saharan countries and South 
Africa are treated separately and independently. In addition, Sub Saharan African 
countries are divided into two groups: the Southern African Development Community 
group (SADC) and the rest of Sub-Saharan African countries thereafter called the 
NON-SADC group. The division is motivated by the fact that SADC countries appear 
to be relatively more integrated with South Africa which behaves as the hub of the 
region. Hence we may expect differences in impact of policy shocks between SADC 
and NON-SADC countries. 
 
 A series of scenarios, which are described in table 5, have been simulated in 
order to assess the relative attractiveness of different possible preference schemesx. 
We first consider a complete and fully inclusive liberalization of trade by developed 
countries (North column). Then we consider full trade liberalization among 
developing countries (South-South column). The third scenario is the establishment of 
a free trade area among Sub-Saharan African countries including South-Africa (SSA-
RTA column). It could correspond to a SADC "plus" trade agreement. The next 
scenario contemplates a duty free access to all developed countries markets for 
product originating from Sub-Saharan countries (DEV column). We then consider 
two similar scenarios based on a duty free access to all developing countries markets 
for products exported by Sub-Saharan countries. While the first scenario (DVG1 
column) does not account for trade liberalization among Sub-Saharan countries, the 
second (DVG2 column) does. The last two scenarios look at regional duty free access 
fro Sub-Saharan products. We report results for a duty free access to the Indian and 
Chinese markets (IND+CHN column) and for a duty free access to MERCOSUR 
countries markets (MER column). 
 
Insert table 5 around here 
 
 Simulations are run using the GTAP 6 database and the standard GTAP 
model. The GTAP 6 database includes data for 57 sectors and 87 countries. However, 
computational constraints do not allow yet dealing with the fully disaggregated 
version. In our simulation exercises, we define 20 sectors and 22 country groups as 
described in table 6.  The group 'Other Asia' includes the Republic of Korea and 
Taiwan Province of China.  The remaining groups are, hopefully, self-explanatory. 
The sectoral aggregation attempts to split out sectors with significant protection, such 
as textiles, apparel, motor vehicles and electronics. 
 
Insert table 6 around here 
 
 The standard GTAP model is a general equilibrium model that includes 
linkages between economies and between sectors within economies. Industries are 
assumed to be perfectly competitive and are characterised by constant returns to scale. 
Imports are distinct from domestically produced goods as are imports from alternative 
sources.  This distinction relies on differentiation à la Armington. Primary factors are 
substitutable but as a composite are used in fixed proportions to intermediate inputs. 
We use the standard GTAP closure modified to maintain fixed trade balances for all 
regions but the USA. This alternative closure is chosen in order to prevent balance of 
trade surpluses from increasing dramatically. 
 
 The database includes tariffs, export subsidies and taxes, subsidies on output 
and on inputs such as capital, labour and land. Border measures are specified 
bilaterally, so the impact of preference erosion can be ascertained. Preferential tariffs 
are included in the initial database. Quota rents in textiles and apparel are modelled as 
export taxes, implying the rents accrue to exporting governments. The data applies to 
2001. However, we first conduct a standard pre-simulation that implements pre-
existing WTO commitments not implemented as of 2001 as described in the first row 
of table 5.  
 
 All results presented below are thus obtained using this updated version of the 
GTAP 6 database. We also present a benchmark simulation which corresponds to full 
trade liberalization. Within the conceptual GTAP framework full trade liberalization 
should generate the largest aggregate welfare gains obtainable from trade policy 
reform. Negative welfare results are imputable to the existence of other distortions 
whose incidence may increase due to resources reallocation induced by trade 
liberalization.  
 
4. Results 
 
 We focus on four dimensions that we believe are relevant to qualify the 
purpose of the paper, namely welfare, exports, sectoral effects and factors 
remuneration. 
 
Welfare 
 
 Table 7 presents welfare effects observed in the various scenarios. Full trade 
liberalization as expected would generate the largest gains on aggregate. The 
simulations also show that there are potentially large gains for developing countries 
from South-South trade. However, NON-SADC countries in the Sub- Saharan region 
would be net losers. The outcome would be qualitatively the same in the case of an 
FTA among all Sub-Saharan countries including South Africa. In addition, gains 
occurring to SADC countries, excluding South Africa, would be more than three 
times larger in the South-South liberalization scenario.  In all other preferential 
schemes both SADC and NON-SADC countries would be net winners. The largest 
aggregate gains for Sub-Saharan countries would be obtained in the case of full duty 
free access to developed country markets. However, 70% of these gains could be 
generated by duty free access to other developing countries markets accompanied by a 
free trade agreement among Sub-Saharan countries (South Africa excluded). 
 
Insert table 7 around here 
 
 In all scenarios, preferences providers are on aggregate loosing less in absolute 
terms than what Sub-Saharan countries are gaining, especially in the case where 
providers are developing countries. In the latter case, some developing countries like 
the `Other Asia’ group would even gain from the preferences scheme.  
In the case of the European Union the projected losses due to duty free access for all 
products originating from SSA countries would amount to slightly more than 900 
millions 2001 US dollars.  
 Thus, welfare effects do not appear to be a strong argument against the 
provision of trade preferences to Sub-Saharan countries by either developed or 
developing countries. 
 
 Interesting information could be retrieved from the source of welfare gains. 
The latter are made essentially of allocative effects and terms of trade effects. In all 
preferences schemes whether preferences are provided by developed or developing 
countries, welfare gains are driven by terms of trade effects.  Gains from terms of 
trade effects, being fundamentally a price-effect, operate as a transfer from the 
provider of preferences to its beneficiary.  
 In 2004, the EU devoted around 7 billions 2001 US dollars to Official 
Development Assistance, meaning that the provision of duty free access to all 
products from SSA countries would imply a loss which is only slightly larger than the 
evolution of ODA observed in the past few years. 
 
Output 
  The focus is on the two groups of Sub-Saharan countries. As a general 
comment based on change in sectoral shares (tables 8a and 8b), there are no dramatic 
differences in output composition across all scenarios. This is not surprising in the 
light of welfare results. Indeed, welfare gains accruing from pure re-allocation of 
resources remain small underlying small shifts of factors of production across sectors. 
However, we notice that the tendency in trade preferences schemes provided by 
developing countries would be to increase the share of manufacture sectors. In the 
case of South-South trade liberalization, this tendency disappears. In the latter 
scenario we observe negative terms-of-trade welfare effects. Sub-Saharan countries 
would have to compete with other similarly endowed countries but much more 
efficient in the production of manufactures. Sub-Saharan countries would focus on the 
production of agricultural goods where they are relatively more efficient. 
Nevertheless they would still have to compete severely with other developing 
countries similarly endowed. The share of natural resources in total production 
remains somewhat constant in NON-SADC countries in most scenarios and decreases 
in SADC countries in North-South preferential schemes. The latter result is due to re-
allocation of resources towards agricultural goods but also to changes in relative 
prices which are favourable to agricultural goods. 
 
Insert table 8a and 8b around here 
 
 As a preferences provider, the EU would not face any dramatic change in 
output composition. The only exception would be the shrinking of the sugar sector (-
15 per cent). Although this represents a sensitive political argument in front of very 
strong sugar industry lobbyists, the redirection of resources away from the sugar 
sector could be made to occur with low adjustment costs relative to the gains that it 
would generate to SSA countries. 
 
Exports 
 
 Exports appear to be more sensible to changes in relative prices than output 
does as shown in table 9.  The sensibility is particularly strong for SADC countries.  
 
Insert table 9 around here 
 
 In most scenarios, exports in agricultural goods tend to increase in both groups 
of Sub-Saharan countries (tables 10a and 10b). The two most significant increases for 
SADC countries are obtained under scenarios with preferences extended in Northern 
markets. In these scenarios, the evolution of manufacture exports in SADC countries 
is the mirror of that of the agriculture exports. As to NON-SADC countries the share 
of agricultural goods in exports reaches its largest values under preferences schemes 
involving other developing countries. In all scenarios the share of manufactures in 
total exports tends to increase. The largest increases are observed in preference 
schemes with developing countries. In the scenario of a free trade area among all Sub-
Saharan countries including South-Africa, the share in agricultural goods and 
manufactures both increase in proportions similar to those obtained under broader 
preferences schemes. This result underlines the still strong potential for economic 
integration with South Africa of all Sub-Saharan countries and not only SADC 
countries.  
 In most scenarios, the share of services in total exports falls for both groups of 
Sub-Saharan countries, which denotes a relatively poor efficiency in their production.  
 
Insert tables 10a and 10b around here 
 
Changes in EU exports composition remain insignificant when enlarging the product 
coverage of their trade preferences schemes, the exception remaining sugar products.  
 
Factors remuneration 
 
 The evolution of factors of production remuneration is an indicator, although 
imperfect, of the forces at work in the distribution of income. Table 11 reports the 
evolution of real returns to primary factors. Real returns are computed as the ratio of 
return to factor to the consumer price index. 
 
 Overall, North-South liberalization and preference schemes would tend to 
favour proportionally more those factors used intensively in agricultural goods, 
namely unskilled labour and land relative South-South liberalization and preference 
schemes. In addition, variations are strong in SADC countries than in NON-SADC 
countries. 
 Real returns to natural resources fall in most scenarios. We observe that 
nominal returns do increase but by less that the overall price index. A notable 
exception is observed in the case of South-South trade liberalization. In that scenario, 
the increase in returns to natural resources is the largest. In other scenarios, changes in 
real returns to land dominate any other change in factor real returns. This is related to 
the evolution of prices for agricultural goods which appears to be more favourable 
than for non-agricultural goods and services. 
 
Insert table 11 around here 
 
 Skilled and unskilled workers' real wages vary similarly in sign in all 
scenarios, except in the case of a full liberalization of trade directed to developed 
countries. In that case, unskilled workers would enjoy higher real remuneration while 
real wages would fall slightly for skilled workers. In general, the rise in real wages is 
larger for unskilled than for skilled workers. The most important difference is 
obtained when duty free access for SADC countries exports is granted by developed 
countries. This is driven by the change in output and subsequent export composition 
which is biased towards agricultural good. As the agricultural sector is relatively more 
intensive in unskilled labour, a rise in agricultural output would translate in higher 
real wages for unskilled workers compared to that of skilled workers. Real returns to 
capital vary significantly only in the South-South trade liberalization scenario. This 
again reflects the change in output and export composition which is biased towards 
the relatively more skilled-labour-intensive manufacture sector.  
 
 In all scenarios, changes in real returns to factors are almost insignificant for 
the EU. Then, the inter-country redistributive effect of deeper preferences to SSA 
products could occur at almost no intra-EU redistributive costs. 
 
Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
  
 The potential for broadening trade preferences for Sub-Saharan African 
countries in developed countries still exists, especially in the EU. Such potential 
remains concentrated in agricultural products like sugar, meat and vegetable oils. The 
deepening of trade preferences would occur at relatively low welfare costs for 
developed countries. Indeed, welfare losses would not be due to adjustment as 
production and exports composition remains almost unchanged under the extended 
preference scheme. They would be essentially related to changes in the terms of trade, 
which as mentioned previously, operate as a net financial transfer from the providers 
to the beneficiaries of the scheme. This enlarged duty free access could be seen as an 
effective instrument of development assistance as it would only be based on market 
adjustment mechanisms.   
 
 However, the focus of Sub-Saharan countries should not be developed 
countries markets exclusively. Simulations show that relatively significant welfare 
gains could be expected from the deepening of preferential access to developing 
countries markets. In addition, preferences schemes provided by developing countries 
would increase exports of manufacture goods from Sub-Saharan African countries 
and stabilize the share of agriculture in total output. The reverse would be observed in 
preference schemes provided by developed countries. Thus, South-South preference 
schemes could result in more production and export diversification and eventually the 
generation of value added in Sub-Saharan African countries.  In addition, there would 
be also a diversification in destinations of trade. From a political point of view the 
Global System of Trade Preferencesxi framework appears to be appropriate to discuss 
possible preferences schemes provided by developing countries in favour of LDCs in 
general and Sub-Saharan African countries more specifically.  
  The simulations undertaken in the paper have considered one component only 
of export performance, namely access to foreign markets. It is recognized that access 
to international markets is a necessary element to foster exports. However, poor 
access to international markets is only one side of an often deep structural productive 
distress, which remains a major cause of social distress. Export performance is also 
determined by supply capacity conditionsxii. Empirical evidence seems to indicate that 
weak supply capacity conditions have represented a major impediment to export 
performance in various Sub-Saharan countries in the 1980s and 1990sxiii. More 
attention and especially resources should be devoted to relax such constraints. This 
would allow most of those countries to fully benefit from all trade preferences they 
have been granted. This would also allow them to face more efficiently the issue of 
preference erosion that would inevitably occur in the future due to the fall in MFN 
rates at the WTO.  
 
 A now topical response to the issue of preferences erosion is development 
assistance and in particular aid for tradexiv. Its proponents argue that aid for trade 
should be devoted to actions and policy measures that will remove exports constraints 
linked to poor supply capacity conditionsxv. A typical example could be the financing 
of pavement of roads or more efficient port infrastructure. Trade facilitation is another 
issue related to supply capacity constraints. “The simplification and harmonisation of 
international trade procedures” could play an important role in promoting exports. 
Indeed, such procedures behave as fixed costs to export and their reduction could 
affect import performance more than proportionally. Lowering fixed costs could 
increase not only the volume of exports in existing trade relationships but also the 
number of exporting sectors and/or the number of trade partners. 
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  Table 1: Trade weighted average applied tariffs (inc. preferences) by 
development status  
 Developed Developing Least developed 
 % % % 
    
Source    
Developed 2.1 9.2 11.1 
Developing 3.9 7.2 14.4 
Least developed 3.1 7.2 8.3 
Total 2.9 8.1 13.6 
Source: Computed from WITS/TRAINS (2004) database. 
 
 
Table 2: Trade weighted average agricultural applied tariffs (inc. preferences) 
by development status and degree of processing 
 Developed Developing Least developed 
 
Un-
processed Processed 
Un-
processed Processed 
Un-
processed Processed 
 % % % % % % 
Source       
Developed 9.0 17.3 15.5 17.3 5.3 16.2 
Developing 7.8 13.5 17.3 17.2 10.7 14.5 
Least developed 2.3 7.6 11.8 18.5 4.8 12.1 
Source: Computed from WITS/TRAINS (2004) database, latest available. 
 Table 3: Merchandise imports by source, 2001 
 Developed CIS & SEE Other Developing† SSA 
 $m $m $m $m 
Source 
    
Developed 3,258,933 225,400 1,177,938 47,996 
CIS & SEE 219,975 90,719 53,739 2,125 
Developing  1,397,432 47,778 814,270 32,297 
SSA 49,540 1,582 15,681 4,981 
Total 4,925,880 365,479 2,061,628 87,399 
Source: Computed from GTAP 6 database.  
Note: CIS & SEE are Commonwealth of Independent States and South-East 
Europe 
 
 
Table 4: Relative factors remuneration (ratio of capital remuneration to other 
primary factors remuneration) 
 
 DEV ASIA LAC MENA 
South 
Africa 
CIS 
&SEE 
Sub- 
Saharan 
AFRICA 
Land 89 11 26 18 48 68 9 
Unskilled 
Labor  
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Natural 
Ressources 
131 60 59 12 11 19 46 
Source: Computed from GTAP 6 database  
Note: CIS & SEE are Commonwealth of Independent States and South-East Europe 
 Table 5: Country and commodity coverage  
Regions Sectors 
European Union Cereals (CER) 
USA, Rest of North America Vegetables, fruits & nuts (VFN) 
Japan Vegetable oils (VOL) 
Other developed Sugar (SGR) 
China Other crops (OCR) 
Other Asia Livestock (LVS) 
India Resources (RES) 
Other South Asia Dairy (DRY) 
ASEAN Other foods (OFD) 
Mexico Textiles (TXT) 
Andean Apparel (WAP) 
Mercosur Leather (LEA) 
Rest of Latin America Non metallic manufactures (NMM) 
Central America Petroleum and coal products (P_C) 
Caribbean Motor vehicles (MVH) 
NON-South-African Development 
Community (NSADC) Electronics (ELE) 
South-African Development Community† 
(SDAC) Manufactures (MMN) 
South Africa Services (SER) 
Middle East and North Africa Transport (TRN) 
Central and Eastern Europe Business services (BFS) 
Rest of World  
† Excludes South Africa. 
 Table 6: Alternative liberalisation and preferences scenarios  
Pre-simulation Phase-out of export quotas on textiles and apparel directed to the 
United States and the European Union and the implementation of 
commitments made by newly acceding WTO members notably 
China + 2004 European Union enlargement 
North Elimination of all import taxes in developed countries on trade with 
all countries.  
South-South Elimination of all import taxes in developing countries on trade 
with other developing countries.  
SSA-RTA Elimination of all import taxes in developing Sub-Saharan African 
countries on trade with other developing countries in the region. 
DEV Elimination of all import taxes in developed countries on trade with 
Sub-Saharan countries excluded South-Africa. 
DVG1 Elimination of all import taxes in developing countries on trade 
with Sub-Saharan countries excluded South-Africa. 
DVG2 Elimination of all import taxes in developing countries on trade 
with Sub-Saharan countries excluded South-Africa + Elimination of 
all import taxes in Sub-Saharan countries excluded South-Africa on 
trade with other Sub-Saharan countries excluded South-Africa 
IND + CHN Elimination of all import taxes in India and China on trade with 
Sub-Saharan countries excluded South-Africa. 
MER Elimination of all import taxes in MERCOSUR countries on trade 
with Sub-Saharan countries excluded South-Africa. 
 
 Table 7: Welfare effects by country (Millions of US dollars) 
 
Free 
Trade 
North 
South-
South 
SSA 
RTA 
DEV DVG1 DVG2 
 
IND+ 
CHN 
MER 
 $m $m $m $m $m $m $m $m $m 
European 
Union 
24245 -171 -7681 -159 -924 -395 -544 -207 -30 
USA 7346 -1751 -7060 -29 -170 -265 -324 -91 -14 
North 
America 
727 636 204 7 12 24 30 8 1 
Japan 25977 16740 -2838 -13 -51 -93 -127 -61 -9 
Other 
developed 
3371 2234 -582 1 -124 7 15 11 -1 
Subtotal 61666 17688 -17957 -193 -1257 -722 -950 -340 -53 
          
China 6453 7850 3381 -19 -10 -31 -45 -36 -2 
India 475 779 -449 -45 -18 -264 -272 -258 -1 
Other Asia 13153 2776 16208 -25 -13 273 253 -27 -4 
Other South 
Asia 
-979 294 -170 -4 -13 -27 -29 -4 0 
ASEAN 7450 5529 7309 -16 10 -45 -47 -13 -37 
Asia 
Subtotal 
26552 17228 26279 -109 -44 -94 -140 -338 -44 
          
Mexico -68 -1133 1192 4 -1 14 15 -1 0 
Andean -541 379 580 4 21 16 24 9 1 
Mercosur 4084 4270 2176 -7 -13 -49 -51 -1 -2 
Rest of Latin 
America 
380 851 43 -1 -70 -4 -3 1 0 
Central 
America 
-190 1181 -505 0 -18 -3 -3 0 0 
Caribbean -153 61 -84 -1 -6 -3 -3 0 0 
LAC 
Subtotal 
3512 5609 3402 -1 -87 -29 -21 8 -1 
          
NSADC 322 308 -127 -203 304 983 1108 420 35 
SADC 491 132 1151 380 1667 270 330 117 42 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
813 440 1024 177 1971 1253 1438 537 77 
Subtotal 
          
South Africa -1677 -529 -543 -91 59 -24 -53 0 1 
          
Middle East 
and North 
Africa 
-1115 -532 5090 1 144 59 91 43 8 
          
SEE -699 -162 -179 -2 2 -7 -9 -3 0 
Rest of World 1087 1502 106 14 54 44 57 21 2 
     
     
Developing 
Countries 
28085 22216 35252 -23 2043 1165 1315 250 41 
          
World 90139 41244 17222 -204 842 480 413 -72 -10 
Source:  GTAP simulations  
 Table 8a: Output Composition in NON-SADC countries (percentage) 
 Initial North 
South-
South 
SSA 
RTA 
DEV DVG1 DVG2 
CER 4.8 4.2 4.7 5.0 4.8 4.7 4.8 
VFN 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.2 
OSD 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 
SGR 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
OCR 9.1 9.2 9.1 9.0 9.1 9.1 9.1 
LVS 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 
DRY 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
OFD 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.9 
Agriculture 27.6 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.2 27.5 
Resources 14.2 14.4 13.9 14.2 14.1 14.0 14.2 
TXT 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 
WAP 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
LEA 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
NMM 8.7 8.6 8.8 8.6 8.6 8.8 8.7 
P_C 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
MVH 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 
ELE 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
MMN 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.3 
Manufactures 15.7 15.5 15.9 15.7 15.7 15.8 15.9 
TRN 14.6 14.8 14.5 14.6 14.6 14.6 14.6 
BFS 16.5 16.6 16.5 16.4 16.5 16.5 16.5 
SER 11.4 11.3 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 
Services 42.5 42.7 42.4 42.4 42.4 42.4 42.5 
Source:  GTAP simulations and author’s calculations 
 Table 8b: Output Composition in SADC countries (percentage) 
 
Initial North 
South-
South 
SSA 
RTA 
DEV DVG1 DVG2 
CER 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.2 
VFN 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 
OSD 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
SGR 2.3 2.3 2.2 4.0 5.6 2.2 2.3 
OCR 8.0 8.1 8.3 7.9 7.7 8.3 8.0 
LVS 5.2 5.1 5.1 7.8 7.7 5.1 5.2 
DRY 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 
OFD 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.8 5.0 4.9 
Agriculture 26.1 29.7 26.1 26.0 30.9 26.3 26.4 
Resources 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.8 7.6 8.0 8.0 
TXT 2.4 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.5 
WAP 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 
LEA 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
NMM 11.3 11.3 11.1 10.1 9.3 11.1 11.4 
P_C 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
MVH 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
ELE 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
MMN 4.1 4.3 4.1 3.5 3.0 4.1 4.1 
Manufactures 20.3 20.1 20.3 18.3 16.9 20.2 20.6 
TRN 19.0 19.0 18.9 18.8 18.9 18.9 19.0 
BFS 14.1 14.1 14.1 13.9 14.1 14.1 14.1 
SER 12.5 12.4 12.4 12.3 12.2 12.4 12.4 
Services 45.5 45.6 45.4 45.1 45.2 45.4 45.4 
Source: GTAP simulations and author’s calculations 
 Table 9: Change in exports by country (Millions of US dollars and percentages) 
 Initial North South-
South 
SSA 
RTA 
DEV DVG1 DVG2 IND+ 
CHN 
MER 
 $m % % % % % % % % 
          European Union 2674109 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USA 888812 5 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North America 267956 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan 453022 7 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other developed 260869 6 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Developed Subtotal 4544768 3 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
          
China 481761 3 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India 61126 2 34 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Other Asia 319080 2 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other South Asia 28837 3 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ASEAN 447936 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Asian Subtotal 1338740 2 10 0 0 0.05 0.05 0.05 0 
          
Mexico 165571 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Andean 52762 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mercosur 102822 5 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rest of Latin America 55085 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Central America 26970 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Caribbean 7484 1 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LAC Subtotal 410695 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
          
NSADC 23553 3 7 4 0.3 0.8 1.9 0.5 0 
SADC 39747 1 8 2 1.9 0.3 1.3 0.1 0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Subtotal 
63300 2.4 8.9 3.6 1.3 0.7 1.9 0.4 0 
          
South Africa 44822 -1 12 3 0 0 0 0 0 
          
MENA 315127 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
          
SEE 36444 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rest of World 156334 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
          
Source:  GTAP simulations 
 
Table 10a: Export Composition in NON-SADC countries (percentage) 
 
Initial North 
South-
South 
SSA 
RTA 
DEV DVG1 DVG2 
Agriculture 19.5 18.9 20.4 19.7 20.0 20.7 21.0 
Resources 47.3 47.8 43.6 46.2 46.8 45.6 44.7 
Manufactures 19.1 18.9 22.4 20.3 19.4 20.6 21.6 
Services 14.2 14.4 13.6 13.8 13.8 13.1 12.7 
 
Source:  GTAP simulations and author’s calculations 
 
Table 10b: Export Composition in SADC countries (percentage) 
 
 
Initial North 
South-
South 
SSA 
RTA 
DEV DVG1 DVG2 
Agriculture 22.1 31.6 23.3 22.3 39.3 23.1 23.5 
Resources 21.6 20.9 20.4 20.9 19.7 21.3 21.0 
Manufactures 39.8 32.6 40.5 40.9 28.2 39.9 40.2 
Services 16.4 14.9 15.8 15.9 12.8 15.7 15.4 
Source:  GTAP simulations and author’s calculations 
 Table 11: Changes in factors real returns (percentage) 
 
Initial North 
South-
South 
SSA 
RTA 
DEV DVG1 
NON-SADC       
Land 2.29 -1.1 0.2 2.72 8.12 8.35 
Unskilled -0.19 2.05 0.47 0.46 1.28 1.71 
Skilled -0.67 2.67 0.43 0.12 0.63 1.07 
Capital -0.62 2.98 0.5 0.04 0.41 0.84 
Natural 
Resources -0.88 13.05 -0.57 -2.68 -8.04 -9.73 
SADC       
Land 22.08 2.55 0.15 35.16 3.18 3.79 
Unskilled 1.68 2.39 1 4.23 0.59 1.05 
Skilled -0.47 2.35 0.89 1.02 0.31 0.7 
Capital 0.06 2.46 1.01 1.64 0.38 0.82 
Natural 
Resources -13.99 5.59 0.41 -29.49 -3.91 -5.25 
Source: GTAP simulations 
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